A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICE AGENCIES
Making the Case for Radar in a FEMA C-UAS Grant Request
Agencies that designate a facility, event, or asset as high risk should treat high-fidelity radar as a baseline requirement for counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) awareness. A credible risk assessment must account for unmanned aircraft that may be autonomous, pre-programmed, modified to limit emissions, or operating without Remote ID. In those cases, a sensor dependent on a command link, broadcast identification, or other radio-frequency (RF) emission may provide no initial detection. Radar detects and tracks aircraft from their physical presence, giving the agency an independent source of airspace data when a target is not cooperative or not transmitting.
No single sensor resolves every question about an aircraft or its intent. The practical objective is a layered system in which radar supplies persistent, precise tracks and other authorized sensors and processes add identification, classification, and response options. For a high-risk site or event, a proposal that omits radar should explain how it will reliably detect and track non-cooperative UAS within the agency’s stated threat envelope.
Detection, tracking, identification, and mitigation (DTIM) depend on timely and usable data at each step. Radar establishes where an object is, how it is moving, and whether its track is consistent over time. High update rates and angular accuracy help maintain tracks through maneuvering and support confident cueing of electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras or other sensors. This reduces the time operators spend searching for a target and gives decision-makers a clearer basis for assessing whether activity warrants further action.
RF direction finding, Remote ID receivers, acoustic sensors, and EO/IR cameras add valuable information, but their coverage or detection depends on the target’s emissions, broadcast behavior, sound, line of sight, or environmental conditions. Radar complements these technologies by providing an independent detection and tracking layer. It can cue EO/IR to a known location, help keep a moving object in the sensor’s field of view, and provide track data to authorized decision and mitigation systems. FEMA’s NOFO explains radar’s value for non-cooperative detection and encourages applicants to propose active or passive radar with a mission-appropriate use case and a basic siting, coverage, and integration concept.
Mitigation authorities and approved technologies can change over time. The NOFO conditions mitigation purchases on the applicable Authorized Technology List and, where populated, the Authorized Systems List; it does not limit the grant to one future method. Even where RF-based systems are the only mitigation platforms currently approved for an agency’s operating model, the sensing architecture should be designed to adapt as other options become authorized. As an operational planning judgment, the vast majority of precision mitigation platforms are likely to depend on radar for persistent, high-fidelity tracks that support cueing and threat targeting. Agencies must prepare for tomorrow’s mitigation by protecting track-data integrity today: accurate, time-stamped position and motion data, continuity through maneuvers, and quality measures operators can trust. That data foundation lets an agency add authorized options later without rebuilding its detection layer.
Public announcements also show a growing choice of Echodyne radar for defense mitigation systems. Trust Automation named EchoShield as the primary radar in its SUADS counter-UAS platform for the U.S. Air Force; KONGSBERG selected MESA radar for integration with its PROTECTOR RS4 and RS6 remote weapon stations; and Echodyne and Allen Control Systems announced a collaboration integrating radar with the Bullfrog robotic weapon station. These examples demonstrate how radar can supply persistent detection and high-fidelity tracks to cue sensors and support effectors across different platforms.
The cost and accessibility of small uncrewed systems make them practical tools for a wide range of actors, including transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and non-state actors (NSAs). Agencies should plan for adversaries who understand how to exploit detection gaps and may use autonomous flight, modified aircraft, or limited emissions. In that risk environment, high-fidelity radar is not an optional enhancement. It is the baseline sensor that lets a jurisdiction detect and track activity beyond cooperative broadcasts and RF links.
Radar does not replace trained personnel, legal authorities, or other sensors. It gives the C-UAS and DFR system a persistent source of accurate track data on which those capabilities can act. For agencies seeking FEMA funding, the NOFO’s express radar recommendation provides a direct basis to evaluate current coverage, document high-risk gaps, and justify a system designed around reliable, actionable airspace awareness.
The Investment Justification should state what successful coverage means for the agency’s missions and how it will be verified. Define the priority areas, representative UAS threats, environmental conditions, track continuity, time to cue EO/IR, and data-sharing needs that matter locally. Set measurable acceptance objectives before procurement, then use testing and exercises to confirm that radar feeds the intended operating picture and response process. The NOFO supports this approach by encouraging a clear siting, coverage, and integration concept and by allowing training and exercises to sustain operational readiness.
References
